Iraqi Politics and Change Politicians on the Eve of Iraq’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections

KEY TAKEAWAYS

This article outlines key political and electoral developments in the Shia and change/madani political space ahead of Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary elections—these trends will remain relevant in the upcoming post-election period

Political elites are increasingly fragmented going into elections due to regional and international developments, political fragmentation within the Coordination Framework (CF), and political and technical calculations at the subnational electoral level

Forming the new government and appointing the next prime minister will take time, as the real contest lies in the informal power-sharing among Iraq’s ruling elites

Change/madani politicians are mainly split between two electoral alliances but are not expected to win many seats

Despite internal divisions, the biggest issue facing change politicians remains the entrenched political elite

Iraqis continue to suffer from longstanding, unaddressed socioeconomic issues which does not bode well for the country’s currently bleak democratic future

Introduction and Overview

On 11 November, Iraq will hold its sixth parliamentary election since the 2003 U.S.-led regime change. Citizens registered across Iraq’s 19 provinces, including the Kurdistan Region, will elect 329 members to the Council of Representatives.

Despite “surreal levels of vote-buying,” many potential voters are expected to abstain, disillusioned by the inability of elections to deliver real change. Iraq’s official voting statistics obfuscate true levels of engagement— turnout is calculated by number of voters divided by registered voters, not the entire voting-age population. Only two-thirds of eligible voters registered for the 2025 elections.[1] Voter turnout has declined over the years.[2] Longstanding economic woes and subpar service delivery continue to frustrate Iraqis.

Iraqi politics is mostly tied to identity as Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds primarily vote for competing parties within their respective ethno-sectarian groups. Since 2005, an informal power-sharing arrangement has assigned the premiership to a Shia, the presidency to a Kurd, and the parliamentary speakership to a Sunni Arab.[3]

Within the context of a disillusioned Iraqi populace, some politicians are attempting to forge change which breaks from the traditional political elite’s way of doing politics. “Change politicians[4],” as I’ve dubbed them in my previous reports, are politicians whose primary objective is disruption of the status quo through the current political system. Change politicians are diverse in outlooks and political ideologies but most of them espouse concepts of a civil identity (madani) and social justice. After impressive wins during the 2021 parliamentary elections following the 2019 Tishreen protests, change politicians secured few seats during the 2023 provincial council elections. Mistakes were made. At the same time, their wins, even if small, were still impressive considering their limited budgets and sustained attempts by the political elites to undermine their platforms.

Although change politicians are mostly Shia, they do not base their program on a Shia identity to gain supporters, nor do they campaign on the need to “protect Shia interests.” Instead, they claim to foster a cross-ethnic following across the country, to represent all Iraqis. Indeed, some prominent Iraqi change politicians are neither Shia nor Arab. Change politicians often belong to political parties that trace their roots to the Tishreen protests and older civic parties. Change politicians also include independents (as opposed to partisan or local leader independents), but their numbers are limited in the current Iraqi political context.[5]

This article is based on more than a dozen interviews conducted with Iraqi politicians and political experts between October and November 2025 and focuses on political and election dynamics affecting change politicians ahead of the November 11 election and its’ projected aftermath. It focuses on two major themes 1) The shifting, fragmented Shia political context in which change politicians are seeking wins and 2) The makeup and development of the main change political actors in Iraq today. Change politicians are mostly running on lists in predominately Arab-Shia majority areas of the center and south, and because Shia political elites dominate this electoral space, this article does not focus on Sunni and Kurdish politics. Iraqi Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish politics of course do not happen in ethno-sectarian silos, but proper discussion of such issues is beyond the scope of this article.

Electoral Law and Purpose of Elections

Upcoming parliamentary elections share some similarities to the 2023 provincial council elections.[6] First, the election will be held under the same 2023 electoral law which reestablished a system of proportional representation using the Sainte-Laguë method, favoring incumbent parties.[7][8] The law is generally regarded as a regression by reformists and independent political experts alike, as the law undid one of the few tangible wins of the Tishreen Movement: district based constituencies and the single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) system which formed the basis of the electoral law for the 2021 parliamentary elections. Second, the continued boycott of elections by the Sadrist Movement, led by influential Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.[9]

As is often the case, the election is less a referendum on government performance than an opportunity for deeply entrenched party elites to recalibrate power among themselves. For some disillusioned, weakly committed voters who view change as unlikely, the focus is on what favors they can extract during campaign season.

“Shia House” Politics in a State of Flux

In the absence of the Sadrists from the political scene, the Coordination Framework (CF) remains the dominant Shia political force. During the 2021 parliamentary elections, the CF, composed of most of the major Shia Islamist parties and actors in Iraq, evolved into a bloc defined largely by its opposition to Sadr’s political project. Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in 2022 left the CF in control of the government, appointing Sudani Prime Minister. Infighting over positions, influence, and resources has grown, but on major issues the CF normally closes rank to protect themselves.

But regional and international developments, Shia political fragmentation amongst the CF, and political and technical calculations at the subnational electoral level are key issues for understanding the current state of Shia and change politics in Iraq.

On the regional level, the aftermath of October 7, 2023 ushered in a period of great uncertainty in Iraq. Iraqi Shia Islamist political elites’ regional allies, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran, are weakened. The fall of the Assad government in December 2024, in particular, stoked fears among the Shia political elite but also amongst many Shia Iraqis who perceive the new Syrian government as a threat—Syrian President Ahmad al Sharaa once fought with Al Qaeda in Iraq. Amid the regional ascendancy of perceived anti-resistance and anti-Shia actors, domestic Iraqi sectarian rhetoric has intensified in the lead up to the election in attempts to secure votes. Media aligned with the CF warn of an outsized Sunni political insurgence should large numbers of Shia voters abstain from voting amid the Sadrist boycott.[10]

On the international level, Israeli and US government officials continue to threaten the self-described Iraqi armed “resistance factions.” US terror sanctions in September and October targeted four major resistance factions who are also a part of the Iraqi state’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as well as entities and individuals reportedly tied to resistance actors and the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC).[11] US pressure on Baghdad for disarmament of IRGC-linked factions continues.[12] Many powerful Shia Islamist parties are linked to armed resistance groups that are simultaneously part of the Iraqi state’s PMF but which also carry out kinetic activities outside the chain of command of the PMF. US threats are therefore seen as an existential threat. During this sensitive period, parties seek electoral gains to prove their weight on the national scene and to strengthen their influence in parliament, government, and to shape Iraq’s next phase to their advantage.

On the national political level, Shia fissures are deepening. Hard-line resistance factions’ political wings refuse to relinquish their arms and denounce attempts to change the PMF as mere agendas of western forces still occupying Iraq. Prime Minister Sudani meanwhile pushes an “Iraq First” platform, presenting himself as a leader who can balance ties with both Washington and Tehran. In attempts to gain popular appeal, Sudani’s government hired hundreds of thousands of workers adding to the already bloated public sector and announced infrastructure projects, with mixed success. Prime Minister Sudani’s formation of the electoral Reconstruction and Development Coalition and bid for a second premiership, a taboo since former Prime Minister Maliki was pushed out of office in 2014, has galvanized other CF Shia leaders to maneuver against him. Qais al Khazali is attempting to define himself as a standalone, younger heavyweight in Shia Iraqi politics, eschewing broader coalitions often led by Badr’s Hadi Al-Ameri in years past. Sadrists’ continued absence from formal politics deprives the Coordination Framework of a unifying political foe. Former Prime Minister Hayder al Abadi is not participating in the elections.

At the subnational level, the aftermath of provincial council elections complicates matters, and continues to affect CF political dynamics at the subnational level. Difficulties in forming provincial councils, the appointment and then removal of some provincial council leaders,[13] intra-coalition rifts and attempts at blackmail[14], managing fissures between Nabni provincial council winners who ran with the CF in the 2023 provincial council elections but who were not core ideological members of their parties,[15] among other dynamics, further strained the Shia political-electoral space. The CF, once mostly united during the 2021 parliamentary elections, has now split into multiple electoral coalitions and lists. (While they never all ran on the same list, today they are more fragmented electorally than ever).

The culmination of these dynamics changed the political and technical calculations of competitors in the November 2025 parliamentary elections. Moreover, money, the specifics of the election law, the number of seats allocated per province[16], and the specifics of the political situation inside the province factors into how alliances and lists are formed. For example, in Basra, which has 25 seats, Governor Assad Edani is a heavyweight whose list is expected to pick up a lot of seats. Likewise, former Wasit Governor Muhammad Jamil Al-Mayahi continues to play an influential role in the province, but Wasit is only allocated 11 seats, making calculations for competing lists different in a smaller province. In contrast, Dhi Qar, which has 19 seats, is notoriously fragmented and lacks one dominant political force. Tracking wins by governors and former governors’ lists in several provinces will also be key to understanding post-election dynamics and alliances.

Despite CF competition and infighting, Iraqi election experts interviewed separately for this article predict that higher interests of maintaining the integrity of the CF will prevail post-election and government formation haggling. While some violence may occur, many deem that it will remain within the current “acceptable bounds” of political violence. Time will tell.

Change Politics Evolve, Pursue Different Trajectories

Some change politicians are boycotting parliamentary elections,[17] and some current change MPs are not seeking re-election,[18] while others withdrew from the elections over coalition differences.[19] Some one-time change MPs decided to forgo madani principles after winning elections in 2021. Some were co-opted by traditional Shia parties, through stick and carrot approaches.[20] Other MPs are now running for 2025 parliamentary elections with former Prime Minister Maliki.[21] The choice between boycotting, collaborating with traditional Shia parties, or running on a “purer” madani platform reflects not just differing tactical, political and technical electoral calculations, but also uncertainty about what space remains for change politics within Iraq’s formal institutions more generally.

Change politicians participating in the election are mainly divided between two electoral lists: the Civil Democratic Alliance and the Alternative Coalition. Some change politicians also joined PM Sudani’s Reconstruction and Redevelopment Coalition. PM Sudani is part of the Coordination Framework and his list is not a madani/change list although some parties and individuals from the madani space joined his list. Additional parties and coalitions running in this election are mentioned in subsequent sections. Electoral expectations are more modest this time. Few wins in the 2023 provincial council elections forced change politicians to reckon with the fact that wins on the scale of the 2021 parliamentary elections are not likely to be repeated anytime soon.

Many members of the two main madani alliances, the Civil Democratic Alliance and the Alternative Coalition, previously ran on the joint Qiyam alliance in the 2023 provincial council elections.[22] An inadequate mechanism for negotiating disputes amongst its members, a wide diversity of political beliefs, and lack of funds, ultimately led to its demise. However, the mere creation of the alliance and electoral wins, albeit limited, should still be considered a feat. It also provided crucial election experience for some change politicians. Some lament that if they had run together again this time that they’d likely win more seats.[23] Others maintain that the split is not just infighting but different approaches to principled politics prevented a joint list at this time.[24] Moreover, as one political analyst explained, like many politicians, some change parties and individual candidates’ choice to run on one list over another has more to do with calculations of chances of success at the ballot box than other specific ideologies.[25]

If they win, different change politicians separately claim that they seek to secure a small but principled parliamentary presence. One advisor to a madani electoral candidate said they “hope to make a parliamentary bloc to play the role of a watchdog, voice critical dissent in the legislature, raise legislation that upholds their values, oppose legislation that contradicts values of social justice, support freedom of expression, as well as other madani rights principles that may come up in parliament.” Others suggest that some no longer strive to change the system from within, as they did in past election cycles, but rather to prevent the total consolidation of power by elite networks.[26] Still others fear that if Sudani wins big, madani candidates who win, but not on his list, will abandon madani principles and join forces with him in parliament.

Prominent Change Politicians Competing in the 2025 Parliamentary Elections

The Alternative Coalition seeks to offer a “national civil and reformist network” committed to “rebuilding the state based on the principles of citizenship, justice, and dignity”[27] as an alternative to what they describe as the “failure, marginalization, and division” created by ruling parties. The thirteen members of the coalition include the Iraqi Communist Party, al-Bayt al-Watani, the Iraqi Republican Assembly Party, the National Civil Movement, the Independent National Party, the Iraqi Economic Alliance, the Iraq Builders Trend, the Iraqi Riyada Party, and several other groups.[28]

A member of the Alternative Alliance said she joined because it includes the “largest number of civil forces” in this electoral cycle and she believes they will implement madani principles and don’t just shout them as slogans. She believes key principles binding them together in the alliance include: social justice, a civil identity, rule of law, working against muhassasa and sectarianism, reforming the political system, keeping weapons in the hands of the state, diversifying the economy, and improving the performance of the government. [29]

The coalition is led by Adnan Zurfi, the former governor of Najaf, who managed to engage madani politicians and launch himself under a new banner. Some Iraqi analysts claim that he is seeking the premiership and would strengthen Iraq’s relations with western partners. Critics say change politicians turned to Zurfi for pragmatic reasons as he brought needed funding, is a known face, and could serve as an outside leader capable of arbitrating differences between the alliances’ many forces. When asked whether some would-be voters for the Alternative Alliance would not approve of Zurfi’s role in leading the alliance, a member of the alliance said, “Voters understand the practical game more these days- not like the early days right after Tishreen- they are more flexible and understand the political game more.”[30] Two analysts separately told the author that the Alternative Alliance will dissolve after the elections, as it is an electoral, not a political alliance.[31]

Prime Minister Sudani leads the Reconstruction and Development list, fielding hundreds of candidates across 12 provinces to contest 240 of the 329 parliamentary seats. Prominent partners include Falih Al-Fayyadh, who heads the Popular Mobilization Commission, Karbala Governor Nassif al-Khattabi’s Karbaala Innovation Alliance, Labor Minister Ahmed al-Asadi’s Bilad Sumer Gathering, a number of current MPs, smaller parties and independents. These figures aim to capitalize on Sudani’s relative popularity, and perceived incumbency advantage. Even for candidates who lose, they hope to be considered for other positions or political gains if Sudani secures a second term.

PM Sudani is a member of the Coordination Framework and his coalition is not a madani/change coalition. Some change politicians, such as current MP Noor Nafea,[32] Nazil Akith Haqi Democratic Movement,[33] and several others are running with Prime Minister Sudani’s Reconstruction and Redevelopment Coalition. When asked why he chose to run with Sudani, one madani candidate said “His rhetoric about building the state, being against weapons in hands outside the government, all of this is good. We hope his popularity, platform, and notoriety will help us win at the ballot box…It was a pragmatic choice.” He said internal disagreements, but mostly lack of financial support, rendered running an electoral campaign on the two other main madani lists not feasible. [34]

One candidate on Sudani’s list, speaking on condition of anonymity, said madani politics are finished in Iraq. “In theory, madani politicians can push for change. But on the ground, its impossible. We can’t achieve anything.”[35] He complained that funding promised to him by the Reconstruction and Redevelopment Coalition, and what he actually received, was extremely small and that most funds went to more prominent groups.[36]

Some criticize what they believe to be “excessive pragmatism” by the candidates who chose to run with Sudani. “A lot of Iraqis are shocked that some madani politicians, who came out of Tishreen, then joined Sudani, Maliki, and others’ lists. They were persecuted by the Coordination Framework and militias, sometimes shot at, and now they are running on the same lists with some of them in the election? They’ve totally lost credibility,” one former member of the local district government in a southern province alleged.[37]

One member of Sudani’s electoral coalition who identifies with madani politics blamed the US for the projected upcoming demise of madani politics in Iraq. He said that the US benefits from the status quo, which is bad for Iraqis, and is letting the Iraqi government get away with it anyway. “The US makes statements, but then won’t do anything about it,” he said.[38] The individual perhaps purposely crafted his statements in this way because he was discussing politics with a foreigner. But he also seemed unaware of the irony of his remarks– blaming the US government for not intervening against the Iraqi government, while also joining the prime minister’s electoral campaign as he sought a second term.

The Civil Democratic Alliance[39] brings together several madani change forces. The alliance includes the Social Democratic Current, Imtidad, and some smaller parties and independent candidates. The Iraqi Communist Party is running with the Civil Democratic Alliance in Dhi Qar, not the Alternative Alliance. The Al Mobadra party led by Dr. Nabeel AlSamaraei is running with them in Baghdad. The alliance is led by the Social Democratic Current’s Dr. Ali Rifaei, a candidate on the list in Baghdad province.[40] Due to financial constraints, the alliance is only competing in Dhi Qar and Baghdad but some of its parties are fielding candidates on other lists in other provinces. Indeed, many of its members are young volunteers. Some commentators, as well as members of other madani lists, have described the Civil Democratic Alliance as the “purest” madani list in these elections.

A member of the Civil Democratic Alliance says that their alliance is not based on ethnicity, but rather on nationalism and brings together candidates from diverse backgrounds and strives for a fundamental goal: to present a genuine parliamentary model for legislation and oversight. He says its aim is to advocate for legislation that strengthens democracy, expands public accountability, reduces corruption, and addresses the shortcomings of previous legislative sessions, including the current one.[42] The Civil Democratic Alliance seeks to distinguish itself as being neither with the west nor the east. They hope to build a long-term political project, not just a fleeting electoral alliance. But the alliance’s lack of funding and Iraq’s ever shifting political dynamics make this a challenging goal.

Change Politicians’ Support Base

Change candidates generally don’t have sophisticated electoral machines to quantify their voters and precisely map their areas of support. But in general, their support bases tend to draw from protest movements, academics, NGOs, intellectuals, supporters of madani ideals, etc. Supporters and voters may vary, however, depending on the background of a specific candidate.

As political analyst and member of the Social Democratic Current political party Laith Hussein wrote recently for Al Araby: “Despite this bleak picture, it cannot be said that liberalism has no social base in Iraq. There are broad segments of youth, the middle class, professionals, and women who aspire to a civil state that guarantees rights, services, and freedoms. But these people lack genuine political representation, which leads them to abstain from participation, vote tactically for the lesser of two evils, or later gravitate towards traditional political currents.”[43] Hussein argues for a long-term political project, which begins at the grassroots level, in universities, unions, and local councils which formulates and cements a liberal discourse amongst Iraqis exhausted by narrow and exclusive identities. He maintains that withdrawal is not an option.[44]

Critics of change politicians offered another perspective. One political observer and former member of a Shia Islamist party said that madani politicians who do actually abide by madani principles garner respect but must improve the way they address potential supporters and Iraqis more generally as their approach doesn’t align with most Iraqis’ conservative values. When asked whether he meant religious values, he replied: “A lot of Iraqis are not actually abiding by religious doctrine in practice, but they are conservative. And they are sectarian, especially when confronted with threats. They don’t like things that go against their way of life- tribes, values, sect… for example, the madani politician’s criticism of the Jaafari law, which is supported by most Shia.”[45] (The Jaafari law refers to Iraq’s new personal status code passed by parliament earlier this year).[46]

One madani actor rebuffed this criticism of change politicians, saying this is an exaggeration, and that change politicians, like all politicians, know how to balance staying true to their platform with balancing emphasizing some messages among some communities and some with others.

Other Change politicians Competing in Elections

Several other change politicians are competing in elections but are not running primarily on one of the three lists mentioned above. This includes parties such as Fao Zakho, led by Basra MP Ammar Abdul Jabbar Ismael, the former transportation minister, which has candidates running on the Alternative Alliance lists in some areas and by themselves, for example, in Basra.[47] Ishraqat Kanoun is also another political party that emerged after the Tishreen protests, transforming from a humanitarian network into a political organization.[48] It has mostly kept a separate identity that is simultaneously Iraqi civil, conservative, and religious.[49] Voters who may be turned off by more liberal strands of madani politics see Ishraqat Kanoun as a more conservative, religious alternative that still retains madani principles but is not Islamist. Ishraqat Kanoun holds seats in parliament and in several provincial councils. Like other madani parties, they are refining their approaches to electoral politics as they’ve gained more experience. A figure close to Ishraqat Kanoun says that they strengthened their media campaign[50] and decided not to run candidates in some provinces this time, focusing on other areas where there is greater chance of electoral success.[51] Still, critics claim that the party’s origins remain murky, and some allege that it has ties with the religious shrine institutions. Ishraqat Kanoun denies it has any official ties with the shrine institutions.[52]

Limited Budgets/Capacity, Corruption, Vote-buying, and Violence

Change politicians generally operate on small budgets, rely on overworked volunteers (often working at their jobs during the day and campaigning at night), face harassment and lawsuits by more powerful political actors often operating with impunity, and lack sophisticated electoral machinery to quantify their support and organize would-be voters.

Widespread allegations of corruption and vote-buying across the political spectrum have reached new heights. Saad Al-Battat, the Head of the Ain Election Monitoring Network, said in a televised interview in late October that “We’re currently facing a surreal level of vote-buying, something unprecedented.”[53] Political analyst Bassem al-Qazwini described these elections as “the most exploited since 2003 in terms of political money and state resources.”[54] Distribution of money, buying voter cards, offering jobs and contracts are used to buy, at least temporarily, loyalty.[55] Indeed, as much as traditional parties claim to have widespread support, they actually just have well-oiled electoral machines that are proficient at mobilizing their base of supporters to the ballot box and convincing weakly committed voters to vote for them by offering money, jobs, and other incentives.[56]

Change politicians enjoy less physical protection than bigger parties, many of whom have armed wings. Numerous change politicians and activists were targeted in years past.[57] But violence is used as a lever of power to counter foes in Iraq, including against traditional Sunni, Kurdish, and Shia political actors. The 2025 parliamentary election period is no exception. Safa’a Al-Hijazi Al-Mashhadani, member of Baghdad’s provincial council and a parliamentary candidate affiliated with the Arab Sunni Al Siyada alliance led by Khamis Al-Khanjar, was assassinated on October 15 by an IED attached to his vehicle.[58] Mashhadani was an outspoken critic of alleged militia land grabs.[59] Violent attacks also targeted candidates and political offices across Iraq, including in Baghdad, Maysan, Wasit, Basra, and Kirkuk provinces.[60]

Post-Election Political Outlook

Some of the most contentious politicking and backroom deals will take place after votes are cast. Post-election alliances will inevitably change. Since 2005, the period from voting to the formation of a government has averaged around 224 days.[61] Electoral results are bargaining chips over ministerial positions and other senior government posts, offering access to “vast state resources, patronage networks, and the machinery of influence.”[62] Street mobilization and violence has also been employed to preserve their influence.[63] It is very important to note that this is not specific to dominant Shia political parties, but also to dominant Kurdish and Sunni parties as well.

A defining feature of this election campaign is Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission’s (IHEC) continuous disqualification of candidates from across the political and ethno-sectarian spectrum from running in the November 11 elections. On October 16, the Judicial Commission for Elections decided to reverse an earlier decision by IHEC that disqualified (for the second time) MP Sajjad Salim from running in the election- he is running with the Alternative Alliance in Kut.[64] A political analyst said that fierce electoral competition, manipulation, money, and intense pressure on and allegedly also by these institutions, has resulted in a large number of disqualifications.[65]

Several analysts and electoral candidates predict that these disqualifications will continue after the election, as some will attempt to disqualify opponents who win seats in parliament.[66]

The upcoming fight over the premiership is likely to be intense, especially amongst CF leaders. Iraqi political analysts will closely follow Iran’s and the US’s reactions to the process of selecting the next prime minister and government formation, and how they maneuver to influence the process.[67]

Change politicians are not expected to win many seats at all. They are still marginal to the broader Iraqi political scene. But widespread dissatisfaction amongst Iraq’s current trajectory means that change politics, in one form or another, will not disappear.

Change politicians suffer from internal challenges complicating their political trajectory. But their biggest challenge remains the dominant elites.[68]

Change politicians’ trajectory is interlinked with the trajectory of Iraq’s nascent democracy that has not consolidated. While change politicians made mistakes and some have been quick to abandon madani goals, the political environment in which they operate is fraught with political violence, a lack of rule of law, and impunity for powerful elites who exploit state resources to break their opponents.

In such an environment and absent major developments, the current outlook for Iraqi democracy is… a bit bleak.

[1] https://ina.iq/en/local/40223-ihec-over-21-million-biometrically-registered-voters.html

[2] https://haleybobseine.com/2023/12/13/iraqs-change-politicians-face-difficult-odds-in-upcoming-provincial-council-elections/

[3] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/iraq-elections-2025-how-votes-are-won-and-what-results-could-mean-iraqs-fragile-stability

[4] My categorization of certain politicians as change politicians is not a normative statement but rather an approximate assessment of their public political work thus far. See these articles: https://tcf.org/content/report/change-politicians-flopped-in-iraqs-last-elections-they-could-still-be-a-force-for-reform/

And https://haleybobseine.com/2023/12/13/iraqs-change-politicians-face-difficult-odds-in-upcoming-provincial-council-elections/

[5] On change independents: In basic terms, independents are politicians who are not official members of a political party. But in reality, independents in Iraq exist along a broad spectrum and may be classified into three different subcategories, defined loosely as follows: The first group might be described as “partisan independents”—those who have partisan inclinations but are not formally members of a political party. (The extent of their partisanship varies.) The second group might be called “local leader independents,” who lead or have strong ties to local establishment interests, such as tribes, businesses, and religious institutions. The third category might be called “change independents,” who claim to push for democratic reform of the post-2003 political system. Change independents’ numbers are limited in the current Iraqi political context. For more details, see https://tcf.org/content/report/under-pressure-iraqi-activists-plot-third-way/

[6] https://tcf.org/content/report/change-politicians-flopped-in-iraqs-last-elections-they-could-still-be-a-force-for-reform/

[7] https://tcf.org/content/report/change-politicians-flopped-in-iraqs-last-elections-they-could-still-be-a-force-for-reform/

[8] The law for the 2025 parliamentary elections differs from the law for the 2023 provincial council elections only very slightly, with regards quotas, etc.

[9] It’s important to note that the Sadrists’ election boycotts do not represent a complete withdrawal from politics; rather, they likely serve as a strategic pause until conditions become more favorable for their return to electoral participation. See this article for interviews with Sadrist supporters, including one of who extols Sadr’s strength in overcoming past setbacks: https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraqs-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly-sadrists

[10] https://substack.com/@tamerbbadawi

[11] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-iran-aligned-militia-groups

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0309

[12] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-parliament-elections-sudani-iran-3f300233274aa87b92a451664a89220f

[13] https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/ishm-july-17-24-2025#:~:text=POLITICS:%20Baghdad%2C%20Wasit%20Governors%20Removed,Mayahi%20to%20an%20investigative%20committee.

[14] https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Two-women-freed-in-former-Dhi-Qar-governor-blackmail-case

[15] Such as in Dhi Qar province

[16] https://english.almayadeen.net/infograph/distribution-of-parliamentary-seats-by-governorates-in-iraq

[17] https://www.annahar.com/arab-world/arabian-levant/255241/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjEhr2z09NU